

# BROWN ADVISORY **PROXY VOTING POLICY**

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*Discussion of Brown Advisory's proxy voting policies and procedures.*

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*Brown Advisory (hereafter ‘the Firm’) considers proxy voting to be an important part of executing our responsibilities to our clients. When clients designate voting authority to the Firm, we seek to vote proxies in line with our fiduciary duty. Overall, the Firm aims to vote in favor of proposals that we believe will maximize shareholder value over time.*

*This policy contains the considerations and preferences that guide our proxy voting on securities—including differences between our process for institutional strategies and for advisory clients—followed by our general Proxy Voting Guidelines, developed in consultation with Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS).*

*This Policy is designed to ensure that the Firm votes proxies in the best interest of clients, so as to promote the long-term economic value of the underlying securities. These votes are informed by the consideration of any material and applicable information.*

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### **Governance and Oversight**

Proxy voting is overseen by a Proxy Voting Committee consisting of colleagues from teams around the Firm including equity research, legal and compliance, sustainable investing, client service and operations. The Proxy Voting Committee is responsible for approving any changes to the Proxy Voting Policy. The Proxy Voting Policy is reviewed on at least an annual basis.

### **Proxy Advisory Services**

To facilitate the proxy voting process, the Firm has engaged Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (“ISS”), an unaffiliated, third- party proxy voting service, to provide proxy research and voting recommendations. In addition, the Firm subscribes to ISS’s proxy vote management system, which provides a means to receive and vote proxies, as well as services for record-keeping, auditing, reporting and disclosure regarding votes. However, securities held within institutional equity strategies are voted on a case-by-case basis, meaning, we do not rely exclusively on the proxy policy, and complement our proxy provider’s research with our own in-house research to arrive at independent decisions, when needed. The Firm will regularly review our relationship with ISS in order to assess its capacity and competency to provide services to the Firm and to review certain of its significant policies and procedures, including those governing conflicts of interests, error identification and correction and processes to evaluate additional information received during the proxy process.

### **Voting Responsibilities**

With respect to securities held in our institutional equity strategies, determining how a vote will be cast begins with our research analysts and, ultimately, rests with the portfolio managers for each Brown Advisory strategy. While we use the recommendations of ISS as a baseline for our voting, especially for routine management proposals, we vote each proposal after consideration on a case-by-case basis.

### **Client Specific Guidelines**

From time to time, clients may prefer to elect alternative voting guidelines. In cases where a client desires to elect alternative voting guidelines, the Firm will work with the client and ISS to identify appropriate alternative voting guidelines. Where no appropriate pre-defined alternative guidelines are available, the Firm will endeavor to work with the client to define and set up guidelines to vote proxies on a case-by-case basis. If pre- defined alternative ISS policy guidelines are selected that the Firm has not previously implemented, members of the Firm’s proxy voting committee will review the policy and determine whether it may be offered to a broader array of clients as part of the on-boarding process. The Firm may recommend a departure from specific aspects of the selected policy’s guidelines when it deems such a departure to be in the client’s best interest.

## **Institutional Proxy Voting Process**

Proxy voting for our equity strategies that are marketed to the Firm's institutional clients is overseen by a Proxy Voting Committee consisting of colleagues from teams around the Firm including equity research, legal and compliance, sustainable investing and operations.

The Committee is responsible for overseeing the proxy voting process. Determining how a vote will be cast begins with the research analysts and, ultimately, rests with the portfolio managers for each Brown Advisory equity investment strategy. While we use the recommendations generated based on the guidelines contained in this document as a baseline for our voting, especially for routine management proposals, we vote each proposal after consideration on a case-by-case basis.

**For more detail on our Institutional Proxy Voting process, please see pp. 4-5 of this document.**

## **Advisory Client Proxy Voting Process**

Proxy voting for our Advisory clients (meaning clients for whom we manage customized accounts in a discretionary relationship according to their goals) is facilitated and monitored by our Proxy Voting Operations team. The team is responsible for arrangements with all custodial partners to have accounts set to electronic omnibus ballot distribution to our proxy voting agency, ISS. When omnibus ballot distribution is not supported, individualized account set up and distribution will be arranged.

Unless otherwise agreed with a client, Brown Advisory's Proxy Voting Policy is assigned by default to our Advisory client accounts. This means that decisions made through the execution of the Institutional Proxy Voting process (including votes against policy) will also be reflected in the voting activity for Advisory Clients.

**For more detail on our Advisory Client Proxy Voting process, please see pp. 5 of this document.**

## **Impediments to Vote Execution**

In recognition of its fiduciary obligations, the Firm generally endeavors to vote the proxies it receives. However, the Firm may abstain from voting proxies or allow for votes to be executed in line with the policy before full review is completed in certain circumstances. For example, the Firm may determine that abstaining from voting is appropriate if voting is not in the best interest of the client. In addition to abstentions due to material conflicts of interest, situations in which we would not vote proxies might include:

- Circumstances where the cost of voting the proxy exceeds the expected benefits to the client.
- Circumstances where there are significant impediments to an efficient voting process, including with respect to non-US issuers where the vote requires translations or other burdensome conditions.
- Circumstances where the vote would not reasonably be expected to have a material effect on the value of the client's investment.
- Circumstances where custodial procedural requirements are overly burdensome.

## **Reporting and Transparency**

Brown Advisory publishes proxy voting activity for our internally managed funds on its website and provides reporting to clients as required or requested.

# BROWN ADVISORY PROXY VOTING POLICY ON SECURITIES

## Proxy Voting Principles for Securities Held within our Institutional Strategies

The following principles serve as a foundation of our approach to proxy voting for securities held within our institutionally marketed equity strategies. For these securities, Brown Advisory's equity research team has researched the company and generally is well-informed of any issues that are material to the company's business model and practices. As such, we believe we are in a position to engage with companies on these issues both through proxy voting and other engagement practices.

- **Proxy voting is our fiduciary duty.** We hold ourselves responsible for aligning our investment decision-making process and our proxy voting, in order to be consistent about what we seek from companies we hold in our institutional portfolios. We seek investments that are building and protecting long-term shareholder value, and we align all proxy voting activity with this goal. Responsible management of sustainability issues may be one input to achieving long-term shareholder value, and as such, we may support those shareholder proposals that encourage company action on what we believe are material risks or opportunities. However, no goal – sustainability-related or otherwise – will supplant the goal of seeking long-term financial performance.
- **Transparency is essential.** Brown Advisory is committed to providing proxy reporting and standardized disclosure of our voting history, as well as publishing N-PX filings as required by law. Transparency is an important step in helping our clients evaluate whether we uphold our stated principles.
- **Bottom-up due diligence should inform voting decisions.** We seek to review each proposal that comes up for vote. Our analysts seek to dive below the surface and fully understand the implications of especially complex and material proposals. The recommended votes generated based on Brown Advisory's proxy voting guidelines are taken into consideration, but do not determine our final decisions.
- **Proxy voting can be a part of a larger program to encourage better management risks and opportunities that may affect the investment return.** Proxy voting is one way to communicate with companies on risks and opportunities that may present a challenge or present an opportunity for a business, and in turn its investment returns. To complement our proxy voting process, and sometimes as result of it, our investment team might choose to pursue an extended engagement with a company as it relates to any information found during the due-diligence process for determining the vote.

## Institutional Proxy Voting Process

Members of the Firm's equity research team receive weekly notification of all upcoming meetings taking place at companies in their coverage. Fundamental research analysts guide vote recommendations on management proposals, and sustainable investment research analysts guide vote recommendations on shareholder proposals, with both groups working together to think through the relevant issues. Final vote decisions ultimately are made by the portfolio manager.

Proposals may require additional due diligence and benefit from collaborative investigation, and this is determined on a case-by-case basis. Where necessary, our analysts will conduct research on each proposal, which may include information contained in public filings, policy recommendations and management conversations. To enhance our analysis, we may collaborate with our internal and external networks, the resolution filer and/ or associated coalition, ISS analysts about their recommendation, the company itself and relevant industry experts. If our additional due diligence uncovers factual errors, incompleteness or inaccuracies in the information ISS uses to generate a vote recommendation, the Firm will seek to bring this to the attention of ISS.

In cases where the final voting recommendation is in line with our Proxy Voting Policy, the vote is cast automatically. When our recommendation diverges from the Policy the responsible analyst will contact the portfolio managers who own the company and who have final decision-making power to share their rationale. In most cases, the portfolio managers agree with the analyst's recommendation, in rare cases they may overrule. In either case, the final recommendation is provided to Brown Advisory's operations team, which documents the rationale for the vote and ensures vote execution. All votes cast against policy require approval from the Firm's General Counsel or designee.

In the event that portfolio managers of different strategies disagree on the vote recommendation for a company they all own, a split vote may be conducted. In general, this disagreement is due to portfolio managers having unique views on an issue. When a split vote occurs, the Fund associated with each strategy are voted in line with the portfolio manager's instruction. All other shares of the company held by Brown

Advisory, including separately managed accounts, are split in a manner that is proportionate to the relative number of shares held across each institutional strategy. Split votes must be approved by the Firm's General Counsel or designee.

### Advisory Client Voting Process

Proxy voting for our Advisory clients is facilitated and monitored by our Proxy Voting Operations team. The team is responsible for arrangements with all custodial partners to have accounts set to electronic omnibus ballot distribution to our proxy voting agency, ISS. When omnibus ballot distribution is not supported, individualized account set up and distribution will be arranged. Unless otherwise agreed with a client, Brown Advisory's Proxy Voting Policy is assigned by default to our Advisory client accounts.

The following exceptions can apply to standard voting for Advisory clients:

- **Client Directed:** A client will always retain her or his authority to request verbally and confirm in writing their request to:
  - Attend a meeting and vote
  - Vote in line with account owner request
  - Request a take no action or abstention
- **No Voting:** A client, during on-boarding, will have the ability to request accounts to be set to have voting ballots mailed directly to the account owner's address.
- **Holdings in Funds:** All holdings owned by our Advisory client base also held in our fund complexes are overseen and governed by the voting practices detailed in the Institutional section.
- **Client-specific Guidelines:** Whereas we have a standard policy default, we have the capability to provide our Advisory clients with the option to customize their voting preferences. Should a client desire a customized approach, the Brown Advisory client team will work directly with the client, Brown Advisory Operations, and ISS to establish and implement client-specific guidelines.
- **No ISS Recommendations:** If a client is invested in a company where ISS will not be supplying voting recommendations (e.g., privately held companies), the analyst covering the company will supply voting recommendations. Should the company not be covered internally, the client's portfolio manager will be notified and asked to instruct the vote.

The following voting practices are applied to separately managed portfolios:

- **Brown Advisory institutional strategies held in a separately managed account (SMA):** Holdings within Brown Advisory SMAs are overseen and governed by the Proxy Voting Committee and follow all protocols detailed in the Institutional section.
- **Externally managed strategies held in a SMA:** Holdings within an externally managed strategy held as a SMA are set up with the delegated and/or appointed manager for voting. In other terms, Brown Advisory yields voting authority to the appointed manager.

## GENERAL POSITIONS

Below is a summary of Brown Advisory's general positions for voting on common proxy questions when Brown Advisory is authorized to vote shares at its discretion rather than by a client's specific guidelines. Given the dynamic and wide-ranging nature of corporate governance issues that may arise, this summary is not intended to be exhaustive.

### Management Recommendations

Since the quality and depth of management is a primary factor considered when investing in an issuer, the recommendation of the issuer's management on any issue will be given substantial weight. Furthermore, Brown Advisory runs concentrated equity portfolios which we believe generally results in holding high quality companies that have strong and trustworthy management teams. This quality bias results in our portfolio managers generally supporting management proposals. Although proxies with respect to most issues are voted in line with the recommendation of the issuer's management, the Firm will not blindly vote in favor of management. The Firm will not support proxy proposals or positions that it believes compromise clients' best interests or that the Firm determines may be detrimental to the underlying value of client positions.

### Election of Directors

Although proxies will typically be voted for a management-proposed slate of directors, the Firm may vote against (or withhold votes for) such directors if there are compelling corporate governance reasons for doing so. Some of these reasons may include where a director: attends less than 75% of board and relevant committee meetings; is the CEO of a company where a serious restatement occurred after the CEO certified the financial statements; served at a time when a poison pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior year; is the CFO of the company; has an interlocking directorship; has a perceived conflict of interest (or the director's immediate family member has a perceived conflict of interest); or serves on an excessive number of boards.

In keeping with our fiduciary duty to our clients, whose capital is invested in the companies considered, the Firm seeks to support independent boards of directors that are aligned with the company's long-term success, which for us is highly dependent on addressing the interests of a broad range of stakeholders, including customers, employees, and communities. We believe boards that incorporate a broad range of perspectives and backgrounds, skills, and depth of relevant experience have the potential to enhance shareholder value. Therefore, we are committed to using our vote, on behalf of our clients, to support this principle. We expect robust disclosure on the skills and experiences directors bring to the board, enabling shareholders to assess the extent to which the board represents the company's stakeholder base, industry nuances, and business model. The Firm may vote against boards, Nominating Committee Chairs, senior/lead independent directors, or Chairs of the board where we believe there is an insufficient range of representation, experience, background, thought, or some combination thereof to meet the long-term interests of shareholders (i.e., our clients).

Separation of the roles of Chairperson and CEO is generally supported, but the Firm will not vote against a CEO who serves as chairperson or director on this basis alone. In the absence of an independent chairperson, however, the Firm generally supports the appointment of a lead director with authority to conduct sessions outside the presence of the insider chairperson.

The Firm will typically vote against any inside director seeking appointment to a key committee (audit, compensation, nominating or governance), since the Firm believes that the service of independent directors on such committees best protects and enhances the interests of shareholders. Where insufficient information is provided regarding performance metrics, or where pay is not tied to performance (e.g., where management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or previously defined targets), the Firm will typically vote against the chair of the compensation committee.

### Appointment and Rotation of Auditors

Management recommendations regarding selection of an auditor shall generally be supported, but the Firm will not support the ratification of an auditor when there appears to be a hindrance on auditor independence, intentional accounting irregularity or negligence by the auditor. Some examples include: when an auditing firm has other relationships with the company that may suggest a conflict of interest; when the auditor bears some responsibility for a restatement by the company; when a company has aggressive accounting policies or lack of

transparency in financial statements; and when a company changes auditors as a result of disagreement between the company and the auditor regarding accounting principles or disclosure issues. The firm will generally support proposals for voluntary auditor rotation with reasonable frequency and/or rationale proposals for voluntary auditor rotation with reasonable frequency and/or rationale.

### Changes in State of Incorporation or Capital Structure

Management recommendations about reincorporation are generally supported unless the new jurisdiction in which the issuer is reincorporating has laws that would dilute the rights of shareholders of the issuer. The Firm will generally vote against reincorporation where it believes the financial benefits are minimal and there is a decrease in shareholder rights. Shareholder proposals to change the company's place of incorporation generally will only be supported in exceptional circumstances.

Proposals to increase the number of authorized shares will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Because adequate capital stock is important to the operation of a company, the Firm will generally support the authorization of additional shares, unless the issuer has not disclosed a detailed plan for use of the shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan. Additionally, if the issuance of new shares will limit shareholder rights or could excessively dilute the value of outstanding shares, then such proposals will be supported only if they are in the best interest of the client.

### Corporate Restructurings, Mergers and Acquisitions

All proposed transactions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis according to their specific merits and drawbacks. Vote recommendations are made based on the review of various factors. Factors that may be considered within the analysis include the reasonableness of the valuation, market response to the announcement of the proposed deal, the fit of the proposed transaction within the company's long-term strategy, management's track record for successful transaction implementation, changes to the governance profile of the company post transaction, and any conflicts of interest that may be present.

### Proposals Affecting Shareholder Rights

The Firm generally favors proposals that are likely to promote shareholder rights and/or increase shareholder value. Proposals that seek to limit shareholder rights, such as the creation of dual classes of stock, generally will not be supported.

### Anti-takeover Issues

Measures that impede takeovers or entrench management will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the rights of shareholders, since the financial interest of shareholders regarding buyout offers is so substantial.

Although the Firm generally opposes anti-takeover measures because they tend to diminish shareholder rights and reduce management accountability, the Firm generally supports proposals that allow shareholders to vote on whether to implement a "poison pill" plan (shareholder rights plan). In certain circumstances, the Firm may support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains a reasonable 'qualifying offer' provision. The Firm generally supports anti-greenmail proposals, which prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a large shareholder.

### Shareholder Action

The Firm generally supports proposals that allow shareholders to call special meetings, with a minimum threshold of shareholders requesting such a meeting. The Firm believes that best practice for a minimum threshold of shareholders required to call a special meeting is generally considered to be between 20-25%, however the Firm assesses this on a company-by-company basis. Proposals that allow shareholders to act by written consent are also generally supported, if there is a threshold of the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize the action at a meeting at which all shareholders entitled to vote were present and voting. The Firm believes that best practice for a minimum threshold of shareholders required to act by written consent is generally considered to be between 20-25%, however the Firm assesses this on a company-by-company basis. In order to assess the appropriateness of special meeting and written consent provisions the Firm would, for example, consider the make-up of the existing investor base/ownership, to determine whether a small number of investors could easily achieve the required threshold, as well as what other mechanisms or governance provisions already exist for shareholders to access management.

## Proxy Access

The Firm believes that shareholders should, under reasonable conditions, have the right to nominate directors of a company. The Firm believes that it is generally in the best interest of shareholders for companies to provide shareholders with reasonable opportunity to exercise this right, while also ensuring that short-term investors or investors without substantial investment in the company cannot abuse this right. In general, we believe that the appropriate threshold for proxy access should permit up to 20 shareholders that collectively own 3% or more of the company's outstanding shares for 3 or more years to nominate the greater of 2 directors or 20% of the board's directors, however the Firm assesses this on a case-by-case basis.

## Supermajority Vote Requirements

The Firm believes that a simple majority voting requirement is generally the preferred requirement to pass a proposal. Therefore, votes against proposals to establish a supermajority vote requirement are generally in the best interest of shareholders. In circumstances where there is a substantial or dominant shareholder, supermajority voting may be protective of minority shareholder interests therefore proposals instituting these requirements may be appropriate in such circumstances. Shareholder proposals seeking to reduce an existing supermajority voting requirement are generally not supported.

## Executive Compensation

Although management recommendations should be given substantial weight, proposals relating to executive compensation plans, including stock option plans and other equity-based compensation, should be examined on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the long-term interests of management and shareholders are properly aligned. This alignment includes assessing whether compensation is tied to both material sustainability and financial KPIs. Share count and voting power dilution should be limited.

The Firm generally favors the grant of restricted stock units (RSUs) to executives, since RSUs are an important component of compensation packages that link executives' compensation with their performance and that of the company. The Firm typically opposes caps on executive stock RSUs, since tying an executive's compensation to the performance of the company provides incentive to maximize share value. The Firm also supports equity grants to directors, which help align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders, although such awards should not be performance-based, so that directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives.

Proposals to reprice or exchange RSUs are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but are generally opposed. The Firm generally will support a repricing only in limited circumstances, such as if the stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude and the exchange is not value destructive to shareholders.

Although matters of executive compensation should generally be left to the board's compensation committee, proposals to limit executive compensation will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

The Firm generally supports shareholder proposals to allow shareholders an advisory vote on compensation. Absent a compelling reason, companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year, since such votes promote valuable communication between the board and shareholders regarding compensation. Where there is an issue involving egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments (including golden parachutes), the Firm will generally vote against a say-on-pay proposal. The Firm may oppose the election of compensation committee members at companies that do not satisfactorily align executive compensation with the interests of shareholders.

## Sustainability-Related Proposals

Brown Advisory seeks to cast all votes prudently and in line with long-term shareholder value, regardless of the topic on which a particular proposal focuses. Shareholder proposals regarding sustainability issues are evaluated in the same manner as all other proposals. We seek to support those proposals that our evaluation shows will likely have a clear and direct positive financial effect on shareholder value and would not impose unnecessary or excessive costs on the issuer. The sustainability-related proposals we support often result in increased reporting and disclosure, which we believe will benefit investors' due diligence. In rare cases where the Firm believes a company has not adequately mitigated significant and material sustainability risks, the Firm may vote against directors.

## Non-U.S. Proxy Proposals

For actively recommended issuers domiciled outside the United States, the Firm uses ISS's international proxy voting guidelines, including, in certain circumstances, country-specific guidelines to generate vote recommendations. These proposals are reviewed in the same manner as U.S. proposals, with votes against policy executed when such a vote is deemed to be in line with the promotion of shareholder value.

## Conflicts of Interest

A "conflict of interest" means any circumstance when the Firm or one of its affiliates (including officers, directors and employees), or in the case where the Firm serves as investment adviser to a Brown Advisory Fund, when the Fund or the principal underwriter, or one or more of their affiliates (including officers, directors and employees), knowingly does a material amount of business with, receives material compensation from, or sits on the board of, a particular issuer or closely affiliated entity and, therefore, may appear to have a conflict of interest between its own interests and the interests of clients or Fund shareholders in how proxies of that issuer are voted. For example, a perceived conflict of interest may exist if an employee of the Firm serves as a director of an actively recommended issuer, or if the Firm is aware that a client serves as an officer or director of an actively recommended issuer. Conflicts of interest will be resolved in a manner the Firm believes is in the best interest of the client.

The firm should vote proxies relating to such issuers in accordance with the following procedures:

*Routine Matters and Immaterial Conflicts:* The Firm may vote proxies for routine matters, and for non-routine matters that are considered immaterial conflicts of interest, consistent with this Policy. A conflict of interest will be considered material to the extent that it is determined that such conflict has the potential to influence the Firm's decision-making in voting a proxy. Materiality determinations will be made by the Chief Compliance Officer or designee based upon an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances.

*Material Conflicts and Non-Routine Matters:* If the firm believes that (a) it has a material conflict and (b) that the issue to be voted upon is non-routine or is not covered by this Policy, then to avoid any potential conflict of interest:

- In the case of a Fund, the Firm shall contact the Fund board for a review and determination.
- In the case of all other conflicts or potential conflicts, the Firm may "echo vote" such shares, if possible, which means the Firm will vote the shares in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of the issuer's shares; OR in cases when echo voting is not possible, the Firm may defer to ISS recommendations, abstain or vote in a manner that the Firm, in consultation with the General Counsel, believes to be in the best interest of the client.
- If the aforementioned options would not address or ameliorate the conflict or potential conflict, then the Firm may abstain from voting.



The views expressed are those of the author and Brown Advisory as of the date referenced and are subject to change at any time based on market or other conditions. These views are not intended to be and should not be relied upon as investment advice and are not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance and you may not get back the amount invested.

The information provided in this material is not intended to be and should not be considered to be a recommendation or suggestion to engage in or refrain from a particular course of action or to make or hold a particular investment or pursue a particular investment strategy, including whether or not to buy, sell, or hold any of the securities mentioned. It should not be assumed that investments in such securities have been or will be profitable. To the extent specific securities are mentioned, they have been selected by the author on an objective basis to illustrate views expressed in the commentary and do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold or recommended for advisory clients. The information contained herein has been prepared from sources believed reliable but is not guaranteed by us as to its timeliness or accuracy, and is not a complete summary or statement of all available data. This piece is intended solely for our clients and prospective clients, is for informational purposes only, and is not individually tailored for or directed to any particular client or prospective client.

Sustainable investment considerations are one of multiple informational inputs into the investment process, alongside data on traditional financial factors, and so are not the sole driver of decision-making. Sustainable investment analysis may not be performed for every holding in a strategy. Sustainable investment considerations that are material will vary by investment style, sector/industry, market trends and client objectives. Sustainable investment strategies (“Strategies”) seek to identify companies that they believe may be desirable based on our analysis of sustainable investment related risks and opportunities, but investors may differ in their views. As a result, the Strategies may invest in companies that do not reflect the beliefs and values of any particular investor. The Strategies may also invest in companies that would otherwise be excluded from other funds that focus on sustainable investment risks. Security selection will be impacted by the combined focus on sustainable investment research assessments and fundamental research assessments including the return forecasts. The Strategies incorporate data from third parties in their research process but do not make investment decisions based on third-party data alone.

Brown Advisory relies on third parties to provide data and screening tools. There is no assurance that this information will be accurate or complete or that it will properly exclude all applicable securities. Investments selected using these tools may perform differently than as forecasted due to the factors incorporated into the screening process, changes from historical trends, and issues in the construction and implementation of the screens (including, but not limited to, software issues and other technological issues). There is no guarantee that Brown Advisory’s use of these tools will result in effective investment decisions.